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Charitable Remainder Trusts:
A Study of Current Problems
Anthon S . Cannon,~ r . *
As anyone connected with the drafting or administration of charitable
remainder trusts is painfully aware, an inordinately long and complex
set of Treasury Regulations has been promulgated under section 664 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.t Moreover, in recent
years the Internal Revenue Service has adopted a highly technical and
rigid approach in its interpretation of the requirements of the statute
and the regulations. The resulting confusion and uncertainty in this
area of the law have caused many attorneys, including experts in the field,
to avoid charitable remainder trusts whenever possible in creating estate
plans for their clients.
This article suggests that the extremely technical interpretive approach currently pursued by the Service is unnecessary in circumstances where it is clear that the interests of charity are not materially
jeopardized, and contends that both the underlying purposes of the 1969
reforms and the interests of the beneficiaries of section 664 trusts would
be better served by a more realistic and flexible reading of the Code and
regulations. The article begins with a synopsis of the basic requirements
of the Code and the regulations relating to charitable remainder trusts,
and presents an overview of the important administrative rulings recently issued by the Service. Various problems which are only now becoming apparent to those involved with the administration of a section
664 trust are then discussed, with special emphasis given to the problems of administering unfunded charitable remainder trusts during the
deferral period. The article concludes with a discussion of a recent committee report by the Tax Section of the American Bar Association which
considered some of the adverse tax consequences and inequities relating
to the deferral period, and, in light of the present state of the case law,
suggests that the statutory amendments proposed by the committee may
be unnecessary.
Charitable remainder trusts have long been a preferred method for
conferring an economic benefit upon both charitable and noncharitable
*B.S., University of Utah, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1965; LL.M. (Taxation), New
York University, 197 1 . Member, New York State Bar.
The author acknowledges the valuable research and editorial assistance rendered by David
K. Detton, class of '76, in the preparation of this article.
?Hereinafter, all citations in the text and footnotes to sections of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as amended, will be by section number only, e.g., section 664.
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beneficiaries. Prior to the enactment of the tax reforms of 1969, the
benefits accruing to the grantor from such transfers in trust were substantial. Income, estate, and gift tax deductions were allowed the
grantor for the then present value of the charitable remainder interest in
such a trust,' provided that the possibility of the trust principal being
~
invaded for noncharitable purposes was sufficiently r e m ~ t e .The
grantor could reserve the income or a fixed amount from the trust assets
to himself or a loved one, could bestow gifts on preferred charities, and
could remove income subsequently earned by the transferred assets from
his own gross income. The absence of any mandatory Treasury or Internal Revenue Service standards for such gifts in trust permitted the
creation of a myriad variety of supplemental trust powers and clauses
which ultimately resulted in abuses.3
Such abuses prompted growing congressional concern that what was
ultimately distributed to charity did not correspond to the value of the
charitable deduction initially allowed. As a result, the Tax Reform Act
of 19694 included new charitable income, estate, and gift tax laws disallowing deductions for a charitable remainder trust unless it qualifies
as a charitable remainder annuity trust ("annuity trust") or a charitable
remainder unitrust ("unitrust") within the definition of section 664.5
In contrast to the law prior to 1969, strict compliance with all of the requirements of section 664 is now necessary before the anticipated tax
benefits may accrue to the grantor.
'Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 CUM.BULL.487-89. For example, if all trust
income was required to be paid to a named individual, the value of the charitable remainder
interest was determined by applying certain Internal Revenue Service tables (based on incremental earnings of 31/2 percent) to the relevant payout period, i.e., a term of years or the life
expectancy of the income beneficiary.
2Commissioner v. Estate of Louis Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1954); Newton Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1947); Treas. Reg. 00 1.170-1(e) (1972), 20.2055-2(b)
(1974), 25.2522(a)-2(b)(1974); Rev. Rul. 143, 1959-1CUM.BULL.247.
3For example, a deduction was allowed even though the trust principal could be invaded
for the benefit of the noncharitable beneficiaries or the charitable remainder interest could
be defeated by a contingency, as long as such risks could be regarded as so remote as to be
negligible. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); cf. Merchants Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943). Further, trust assets could be invested in speculative or
high risk investments which enhanced current yield and maximized the amount distributable
to the noncharitable income beneficiary while causing serious risk to the value of the remainder interest ultimately payable to charity. S. REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86
(1969).
For an excellent discussion of the rules applicable to pre-1969 charitable remainder trusts
see Taggart, Charitable Deductions for Transfers of Remaindel- Interests Subject to Invasion, 21 TAX
L. &v. 535 (1966).
For a discussion of the purposes underlying the Tax Reform Act of 1969 see U.S. TREASURY
DEP'TTAXREFORM
STUDIES
AND PROPOSALS
21,38 (Part l), 182-85, 190-93(Part 2) (1969).
4Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
5Sections 170(f)(2), 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2). Other than transfers to charitable remainder
trusts, the T a x Reform Act of 1969 permits a deduction for transfers to a pooled income
fund described in section 642(c)(5), for gifts of a remainder interest in a personal residence
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A. T h e Definition of Annuity Trusts and Unitrusts - Section 664(d)

The charitable remainder trusts described in section 664 are divided
into two categories, annuity trusts and unitrusts. The principal difference between the two is that in an annuity trust a "sum certain (which is
not less than 5% of the initial net fair market value of all property placed
in trust)" is annually distributed to the noncharitable beneficiary whereas in a unitrust a "fixed percentage (which is not less than 5% of the net
fair market value of [the trust's] assets, valued annually)" is distributed
to the noncharitable beneficiary.6
An annuity trust assures the donor that a certain dollar amount will
be distributed annually to the noncharitable beneficiary, irrespective of
fluctuations in the market value of the trust assets. However, the annual
amount distributed under a unitrust will vary with any rise or fall in the
market value of the trust assets.7 The amount payable to the noncharitable beneficiary under a unitrust may also be defined in the trust agreement as the lesser of the fixed percentage of trust assets, described above,
or farm, or for gifts of an undivided portion of the donor's entire interest in property. Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.170A-7 (1972), 20.2055-2(e)(2) (1974), 25.2522(c)-3 (1974). T h e limited nature of
these exceptions demonstrates the pervasive changes wrought by the Tax Reform Act of 1969
in split-interest charitable gifts. A discussion of these other forms of giving, however, is
beyond the scope of this article.
6Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(1), -3(a)(l) (1972). T h e requirement that a sum certain or a
fixed percentage of no less than 5 percent be paid to the noncharitable beneficiary is arbitrary and seemingly unnecessary. T h e apparent genesis of this rule was congressional concern that charitable remainder trusts would be used to circumvent the minimum income distribution requirements imposed upon private foundations under section 4942, viz., that a
minimum percentage of the assets held by charity or available for charitable uses be currently
expended for such purposes. Because of the tax exempt status of section 664 trusts, Congress
feared that by limiting the payout to the noncharitable beneficiary of such trusts, all income
in excess of such amounts would be accumulated tax free. S. REP.NO. 552, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 90 (1969). There is little similarity, however, between the policy considerations underlying the section 4942 payout requirement for amounts currently held by or available to
charity and section 664 trusts which make assets available to charity only after the expiration
of an intervening noncharitable interest. Moreover, a lesser payout in the case of a charitable
remainder trust would increase the value of the remainder interest ultimately distributed
to charity.
Although the stated reason for the 5 percent minimum was avoidance of a theoretical, but
highly unlikely, abuse, it is questionable whether the rigidity and highly arbitrary nature of
the present cure is necessary, especially in light of its double chilling effect on charitable
giving. First, a donor may not increase his charitable contribution (with its concomitant deduction) by decreasing the percentage payout to the noncharitable interest below 5 percent.
Second, instead of permitting any excess income to accumulate tax free, the 5 percent minimum distribution requirement results in current taxation of such income in the hands of the
noncharitable beneficiary while depleting the total amount ultimately distributable to
charity. The minimum distribution requirement, therefore, has the effect of increasing the
government's income at the expense of charity.
7The net fair market value of the trust assets is required to be computed each year. Treas.
Reg. 8 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(a). For a discussion of net fair market value see notes 72-78 and accompanying text infra.
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or the actual income of the trust.* This alternative provision is only
applicable to a unitrust, as an annuity trust with such a provision would
be disqualified under section 664(d).9
Section 664(d) imposes additional requirements upon both annuity
trusts and unitrusts. No invasion of the charitable remainder interest,
other than for authorized payments to the noncharitable interest, is permitted in either type of trust.lO Both types of trusts are required to provide that upon termination of all noncharitable interests, the remainder
interest must be "transferred to or for the use of, [a charitable] organization described in Section l7O(c)" or retained by the trust for such use."
T h e noncharitable beneficiaries of these trusts may be "one or more
persons" at least one of whom is not an organization described in section
170(c), and if any beneficiary is an individual, he must be living at the
time of the creation of the trust.12 Finally, the noncharitable interest may
be paid either for a fixed term not to exceed 20 years or for the life or lives
of the individual noncharitable beneficiaries, but may not be paid for
any combination of the two?

B. Other Rules and Requirements of the Statute and Regulations
T h e other subsections of section 664 comprise a highly unusual combination of new rules -rules which have produced a lengthy and intricate body of regulations. A grantor must satisfy all of these rules in creating a charitable remainder trust or lose all tax benefits, since such rules
are applicable notwithstanding other provisions of the Code.l4 Although
other articles have discussed in detail the rules set forth in the regulations,l5 a few general remarks concerning some of the more important
requirements applicable to both annuity trusts and unitrusts may be
appropriate.
These rules include the requirements that: (a) no trust provision may
restrict the trustee from investing trust assets in a manner "which could
result in the annual realization of a reasonable amount of income or gain
from the sale or disposition of trust assets";16 (b) such trusts must "meet
STreas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(b)(1972).
gTreas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(l)(i),-2(a)(l)(iii)(1972). See also H. R. REP.NO. 782, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 296 (Conf. Rep. 1969).
loTreas. Reg. §§ 1.664-2(a)(4),-3(a)(4)(1 972).
llTreas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(6),-3(a)(6)(1972).
12Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(3),-3(a)(3)(1972).
l3Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(5),-3(a)(5)(1972).
'4Section 664(a).
'5E.g., Seymour, Charitable Remainder Trusts, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 301 (1973); Sneed, Charitable Remainder Trusts, 1973 U . So. CAL.TAXINST. 87; Olsen and Ledwith, Charitable Remainder Trusts: How to Comply with Final Regulations, 38 J . TAX2 (1973); Teitell, Chari8c ESTATES
859 (1972).
table Remainder Unitrusts Under the T a x Reform Act, 1 1 1 TRUSTS
16Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(a)(3) (1972). The meaning of the prohibition is not totally clear,
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the definition of and function exclusively as a charitable remainder
trust from the creation of the trust";17 and, (c) unless already proscribed by state law, the governing trust instrument must prohibit acts
which would result in the imposition of any excise tax described in sections 4941 through 4945.l8 Charitable remainder trusts are also exempt
but it would appear to apply to express restrictions in the trust instrument which prohibit
the trustee from selling certain assets, which require their retention under all or most all circumstances, or which otherwise unreasonably limit the investment policy to be pursued by
the trustee. However, the language of the prohibition does not require that a minimum
amount of income, e.g., a minimum percentage of trust assets, be earned each year. It should
be noted that such a standard based on the minimum distribution rules of section 4942 was
considered by the Treasury and the Service, but was rejected because of the difficulties entailed
in applying a single standard to the immense variety of factual settings in which section 664
trusts arise.
Although the regulations do not expressly forbid any particular types of investments for
trust assets, in selecting an investment policy the trustee must consider state law requirements
of fairness to all beneficiaries. For example, since the trust is tax exempt in order to protect
the remainder interest from diminution, an investment in tax exempt securities will have to
be justified on grounds other than their tax exempt character. In addition, because such
investments clearly favor the noncharitable income beneficiary at the expense of the charitable
remainderman, there is a substantial possibility that abuses in this area would cause the Service to prohibit all investments in tax exempt securities in conformity with the present restrictions applicable to pooled income funds. Section 642(c)(5)(c).
A related question is whether this regulation has established a federal rule of prudent
fiduciary conduct or whether state law concepts will continue to be controlling in defining
such phrases as "unwarranted restrictions" and "reasonable amount of income or gain." I n
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940), the Court described the relationship of federal
and state law as applied to taxation as follows: "State law creates legal interests and rights.
The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed." Id.
at 80. Applying this standard in the present context, the better position would appear to be
that state law concepts will continue to exert a substantial influence in evaluating the "prudence" of the trustee's investments. It should be noted, however, that since Commissioner v.
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), only the decisions of the highest state court will be accepted as
controlling pronouncements of state law.
17Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-1(a)(4) (1972). A trust is deemed created at the earliest time that
neither the grantor nor any other person is treated as the owner of the entire trust under the
rules applicable to grantor trusts described in subpart E, part 1 of subchapter J , but "in no
event prior to the time property is first transferred to the trust." Id. Thus, if grantor trust
powers terminate with respect to a portion of the trust, but are retained over the remaining
portion, the trust will not qualify because it will not have been a section 664 trust in its entirety
from the moment created. Treas. Reg. 8 1.664-1(a)(6)(example 2) (1972).
An important exception to this rule applies in the case of testamentary transfers in trust.
In such cases, if the obligation to pay the annuity or unitrust amount begins on the date of the
settlor's death, a charitable remainder trust is deemed created on such date even though the
trust is not completely funded until a reasonable period has elapsed for administration of the
estate or settlement of another terminating trust. Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(a)(5) (1972). See also
notes 63-64 and accompanying text infra.
Issection 508(e). Section 664 charitable remainder trusts constitute split-interest trusts within the meaning of section 4947(a)(2) and consequently are subject to certain of the private
foundation rules, including the section 4941 prohibitions against self-dealing and the section
4945 restrictions on taxable expenditures. However, a complete discussion of the effect of
these rules on section 664 charitable trusts is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion
of the basic requirements of these rules see Rev. Rul. 395, 1972-2 CUM.BULL.340, 343, 349;
Rev. Rul. 74-368, 1974 INT.REV. BULL.NO. 30, at 17. T h e draftsman should also consult the
provisions of the applicable state law to determine the effect of legislation enacted to comply
with section 508(e), if any, on the language of the trust instrument.
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from federal income taxes, unless the trust has unrelated taxable business income.19 An exclusive set of rules determines the amount and
character of income to be recognized by the noncharitable beneficiary
as the result of trust distribution^.^^ Finally, section 664(e) provides
rules for valuing the amount of the contribution deduction for a gift of a
charitable remainder interest in trust, but it should be noted that other
sections of the Code and not section 664 authorize the deduction.21

Prior to 1974, only three published rulings had been issued since the
publication of final regulation^.^^ However, in 1974, eight rulings affecting section 664 trusts were issued -an indication that the problems
presented by the complexity of the regulations are beginning to ~urface.~3
A review of these recently published rulings is instructive in at least two
respects. First, the issues confronted in the rulings are, for the most part,

lgSection 664(c). For example, a trust will have unrelated business income if it receives
income-producing property subject to a mortgage or other similar lien even if the trust is not
personally liable for the obligation. Such property constitutes debt-financed property and all
or a portion of the income from the property will constitute unrelated business income for
purposes of sections 5 12 and 5 14.
20Section 664(b). Taxation of distributions to noncharitable beneficiaries is not governed
by the distributable net income rules generally applicable to trusts and estates, but rather by
the special rules of Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(d)(1972), which require the trustee to maintain detailed records as to the amount and character of all income received by the trust as determined at the end of each taxable year. Distributions of such amounts to noncharitable beneficiaries are deemed paid out of the following categories, first from assets includable in the
current taxable year and then from prior years, in the following order: (1) as ordinary income
without regard to the net operating loss deduction, since such losses are allowed both as
carrybacks and unlimited carryforwards against ordinary inco,me (e.g., interest, dividends,
royalties); (2) as capital gains determined on a net cumulative basis pursuant to special rules
of the regulations (covering long- and short-term character) and without regard to the usual
carryforward and carryback rules of section 1212; (3) as other income (e-g., tax-exempt interest);
and (4) as corpus. Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(d)(2) (1972) stipulates that expenses directly attributable to an income class within a category reduce the amount of income therein, and that
after such reductions, all other expenses not directly attributable to any income class are to
be allocated among the classes within each category on the basis of the proportional gross
income of each class. But in no event may a class of income be reduced below zero by reason
of the allocation of expenses. If directly attributable expenses exceed the income of a class,
the expenses are lost. Indirect expenses, however, would be reallocated to other classes of
income. Finally, Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(d)(3) (1972) requires proration of the categories of
income and corpus where distributions are made by the trust to two or more beneficiaries.
*lTreas. Reg. $8 1.664-2(c),-2(d), -3(c), -3(d),-4 (1972).
22Proposed Treasury Regulations under section 664 were initially issued on August 5, 1970
(35 Fed. Reg. 12467), and reissued on September 18, 19'71 (36 Fed. Reg. 18667). Final regulaDEC.7202, 1972-2
tions were published on August 23, 1972 in Treasury Decision 7202. TREAS.
CUM.BULL.313.
23As of AIarch 1, 1975. Three of these rulings are discussed in the text accompanying notes
43-50 infia. T h e other five rulings are: Rev. Rul. 39, 1974-1 CUM.BULL.156; Rev. Rul. 53,
1974-1 Cmr. BULL.60; Rev. Rul. 149, 1974-1CUM.BULL.157; Rev. Rul. 283, 1974-1 CUM.BULL.
157; and Rev. Rul. 74-368, 1974 INT. B v . BULL.NO. 30, at 17.
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questions of significance, and illustrate the type of narrow, complex
issue which can be presented. Second, the rulings also demonstrate that
the Service has adopted a highly technical approach to interpreting
questions raised under the statute and regulations, and indicate that
failure to meet all of these requirements will result in loss of the anticipated tax benefits.

A. Revenue Ruling 72-395 -Model

Trust Forms

Contrary to its long-standing policy of refusing to publish and give
advance approval to trust forms, the Service issued model provisions for
charitable remainder trusts in Revenue Ruling 72-395.24 These provisions are merely "illustrative," however, as the ruling expressly states
that no fixed language is required in order to qualify under section 664.25
However, the model provisions will be "accepted by the Internal
Revenue Service in the absence of any showing that they are not enforceable under applicable local law. "26
Only a general discussion of the model provisions and the comments
provided by Revenue Ruling 72-395 will be attempted in this article
since excellent discussions of the regulations and the ruling appear elsewhere.27 The ruling describes six mandatory provisions for annuity
trusts, including: (1) creation of a proper annuity amount, (2) creation
of a proper remainder interest, (3) selection of an alternative charitable beneficiary if the remainderman does not qualify under section
l7O(c) at the time of distribution, (4) computation of the annuity amount
in short and final taxable years, (5) prohibition of additional contributions, and (6) inclusion of prohibitions governing private foundation^.^^
Seven mandatory provisions are made applicable to unitrusts consisting
of all of the above except (5), which is modified to permit additional
contributions if the trust instrument so provides, and a mandatory provision requiring adjustments if the unitrust amount has been incorrectly
determined.29 Nine optional provisions, with comments, are also set
forth for both types of trusts.30
The significance of this ruling stems not only from the model provisions, but also from the fact that the language of the ruling was developed contemporaneously with the drafting of the final regulations
and issued one day prior to their publication. Any questions concerning
the interpretation of the regulations should, therefore, be considered in
--

-

-

241972-2 CUM.BULL.340.
25Zd. at 341-42.
26Id. In addition, a valid trust must be created under the applicable local law.
27Seenote 15 supra.
28Rev. Rul. 395, 1972-2 CUM.BULL.340, 342-44.
29Zd. at 347-49.
3OId. at 344-47, 350-52.
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light of the provisions of this ruling, as courts are likely to regard it as
tantamount to an extension of the reg~lations.3~
Revenue Ruling 72-395 also provides that Revenue Procedure 72-3
applies to determine whether the Service will issue advance rulings
concerning qualification of an instrument under section 664.32 Under
Revenue Procedure 72-3 the Service will not entertain requests concerning testamentary trusts, but will accept such requests concerning
inter vivos trusts.33

B. Reuenue Ruling 73-571 - Common Trust Fund Investments
Revenue Ruling 73-57 permits a bank, as trustee of a unitrust, to
invest the assets of the trust in a common trust fund described in section
584(a) of the Code without jeopardizing either the exempt status of the
unitrust or the donor's charitable deduction. T h e ruling involved a
common trust fund in which an aggregate of less than 2 percent of the
outstanding units of participation were owned by qualified charitable
remainder trusts and over 90 percent of the units were owned by inter
vivos revocable noncharitable trusts. The bank, as trustee of the unitrust, had full discretion over the investment of trust assets.35
Normally, published rulings are issued only in cases where an important question has not been resolved by existing case law, regulations, or
other rulings. It is therefore surprising that the Service felt it necessary
to issue a ruling on this question, as one would have thought that the
right of a bank to make such an investment was clear.
One issue which may have been implicitly decided by the ruling is
whether investment by a bank trustee of unikust assets in the bank's common trust fund, for which it also acts as trustee, constitutes a proscribed
311n contrast to regulations, which are statements of general policy or interpretations for
guidance of the general public, the holding of a Revenue Ruling is limited since it is addressed to a particular state of facts. Rev. Proc. 1, 1972-1 CUM.BULL.693, 694-95. Revocation of a Revenue Ruling is normally prospective only. Revenue Ruling 72-395, however, is
not addressed to a particular state of facts and cannot be so limited, since it expresses general
policy and an interpretation of the statute and regulations. See Rogovin, The Four R.'s:
Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity -A Viewfrom Within, 8 CCH 1974 STAND.
FED.TAX
REP. 15980 A.0152, at 67,033.
3*Rev. Proc. 3, 1972-1CUM.BULL.698.
33Zd. at 700.
34Rev. Rul. 571, 1973-2CUM.BULL.213.
35The ruling does not discuss whether a trust instrument may properly direct the trustee
to invest trust assets in investments which are clearly income producing, such as Treasury
bills, bank deposits, common trust funds maintained by the bank, or other investments which
have a proven earnings history. Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-1(a)(3)(1972) does not clarify whether all
express restrictions are prohibited or merely those which could prevent production of a
reasonable amount of current income or gain. Although there is no clear answer to any of
these questions, there should be little harm in permitting restrictions which allow the trustee
sufficient opportunity to earn a reasonable amount of income or gain as measured by the
state prudent man standards. See note 16 supra.
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act of self-dealingwithin the meaning of section 4941.36 Clearly, the bank
is a disqualified person37 with respect to the unitrust. T h e investment of
trust assets in the bank's common trust fund is a service rendered for a fee,
and therefore constitutes an act of self-dealing. The ruling thus appears
to constitute an implicit determination that one of the exceptions to the
definition of self-dealing applies. The most likely exception is that providing for the payment of compensation to a disqualified person in an
amount which is not excessive for "personal services which are reason~
able and necessary" to carry out the purposes of the ~ n i t r u s t . 3Whether
the ruling would continue to apply to investments in a common trust
fund in which a substantial portion or a majority of all participation units
were owned by qualified charitable remainder trusts is left unclear. T h e
Service may contend that such a common trust fund is tantamount to a
type of pooled income fund where assets are commingled for investment
without meeting the requirements of section 642(c)(5) or the apparent
requirement that charitable trust assets be held and invested separately
from assets of other t r ~ s t s . 3 ~

C. Revenue Ruling 73-610- Investment Restrictions
In Revenue Ruling 73-61O,*O the annuity trust permitted the grantor's
spouse, who was also the sole life income beneficiary of the trust, to have
the use of the grantor's antique collection for her life. The annuity trust
failed to qualify under section 664 because the existence of a life estate in
the antique collection restricted the trustee from investing all of the trust
assets in a manner "which could result in the annual realization of a reasonable amount of income and gain from the sale or other disposition of
trust assets." The facts indicated that all of the other assets of the trust
were income producing, and the trustee was not subject to any restriction
as to their investment.
The ruling illustrates the severe consequences if a relatively innocuous
right is given to the income beneficiary in violation of the strictly interpreted regulations. T h e Service apparently gave no consideration to
whether the antique collection would likely appreciate over the years, or
whether the life estate in any practical way jeopardized the interests of
charity. The lesson of the ruling, it appears, is that a life estate in any
asset of a charitable remainder trust (whether income producing or not)
will cause disqualification of the trust under section 664. Efforts
-

-

-

-

-

-

---

-

36Section4941 (d)(l )(C).
37Section 4946(a)(l)(B).
38Section 4941 (d)(2)(E).
39Although no such requirement is expressly stated in the statute and regulations, it may
be inferred from the no additional contribution rule applicable to annuity trusts and the
requirement that all unitrust assets be valued annually.
401973-2 CUM.BULL.
213.
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to avoid this result by including the fair rental value of the reserved life
estate as a component of the annuity or unitrust amount payable will
probably fail, because under normal circumstances, the trustee cannot
sell an asset subject to a life estate.
In addition to the ground discussed in the ruling, the trust might also
have been disqualified on the theory that the right of the noncharitable
beneficiary to use a principal asset of the trust during her life constituted
an act of self-dealing.41

D. Revenue Ruling 74-19 - Payout Formula
Revenue Ruling 74-1942involved a trust instrument which formulated the unitrust amount payable as 6 percent of the annual net fair
market value of the trust assets reduced by the portion of the trustee's fee
fairly attributable to the income beneficiary's interest. In no event, however, was the amount so deducted to reduce the unitrust amount payable
below 5 percent of the net fair market value of the trust assets. The
ruling concluded that the unitrust failed to qualify under section 664 because the unitrust amount payable was not literally computed pursuant
to a "fixed percentage'' of the net fair market value of trust assets.
T h e Service's strict interpretation of the regulations is surprising, because the unitrust amount payable could be computed with precision
and could not fall below the 5 percent minimum. Any hope that the
Service would mitigate the rigidity of the regulations by a flexible administrative interpretation, especially in areas where little or no abuse is
possible, should be dispelled by this ruling. Absent a change in the Service's position, a prudent draftsman must assume that any reduction or
adjustment in the annuity or unitrust amount payable, for whatever
reasons, risks disqualification of the trust under section 664. This position raises particular difficulties in New York43 and other jurisdictions,
where a "Warms a d j ~ s t m e n t ' "is~ required by state law in every case
where administration expenses of an estate or trust are claimed as deductions on the trust's income tax return. The theory underlying this adjustment is that a deduction on the trust's income tax return benefits the
income beneficiaries, and therefore the principal must be reimbursed for
its fair share of the deduction. Any adjustment of the annuity or unitrust
amount based on such considerations, however, appears to risk disqualification of the trust under section 664. This presents a dilemma to the
trustee in jurisdictions holding him liable to the remainderman for
failure to make the adjustment.
4lSee sections 4941(d)(l)(E) and 494'7(a)(2)(A).

4219'74-1CLM.BULL.155.

K. TRUSTS
LAW9 11-1.2(X)(McKinney 196'7).
43K.Y. EST.,POWERS,
re Warms' Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (X.Y. County Sur. Ct. 1955).
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E. Revenue Ruling 74-386- Payout Termination
Revenue Ruling 74-38645 permits a qualified remainder trust to
terminate the payment of the annuity or unitrust amount to each life
beneficiary with the regular payment next preceding the date of death
of such beneficiary. Prior to this ruling, several private rulings had been
issued in which the Service took the position that payment of the annuity
or unitrust amount could only terminate with the regular payment next
preceding the termination of all noncharitable interests.46 Under this
published ruling, administration of charitable trusts is therefore made
easier since the obligation to pro rate the amount owing to the date of
each beneficiary's death is avoided.
The issuance of Revenue Ruling 74-386 constitutes a reversal of the
Service's original position on what appears to be an extremely technical
point, and is the first indication that a more practical and flexible construction may be given certain of the regulations. It is hoped that this
approach will develop into a trend in all cases where there is little or n o
practical risk that the interests of charity or the basic purposes underlying
the statute would be jeopardized.

F. Revenue Ruling 74-481- Computation of the Unitrust Payout
When Additional Contributions Are Received
Revenue Ruling 74-48147illustrates the computation of the unitrust
amount payable where additional contributions are received by the unitrust during the taxable year.4* Unlike the usual published ruling which
reaches a conclusion in the context of stated facts, the ruling discussed
the computations in general terms and may be viewed by a court as being
tantamount to an extension of the reg~lations.~g
No discussion of these computations will be made here, except to point
out a trap which should be avoided. T h e Service has issued a private
ruling disqualifying a trust under section 664 because the denominator
of the fraction used to pro rate the amount owing to the noncharitable interest, in the case of a taxable year shortened by the death of the sole life
beneficiary, was the last day of the taxable year rather than the earlier of
that date or the date of the beneficiary's death. In this case, the trust
451974INT.REV.BULL.NO. 32, at 1 1 .
46Forexample, in the case of a trust with two life beneficiaries, this rule would have meant
that payment could only terminate upon the death of the second life beneficiary because that
was the end of the "period" referred to in Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(5)(1972). A trust provision permitting termination of such payment upon the death of the first as well as upon the death o f
the second life beneficiary would have caused disqualification of the trust under section 664
because the "period"had not come to an end.
471974 INT.REV.BULL.NO.40, at 15.
48Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(b)(1972).
49See note 3 1 supra.
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failed to qualify even though the noncompliance occurred in a relatively
minor matter, and actually enhanced the value of the charitable remainder interest. Moreover, it would not appear that this trap can be avoided
by arguing that the taxable year ends upon the death of the income beneficiary because charitable remainder trusts do not terminate for tax purposes upon such death, but remain open for a reasonable period of time
to permit settlement of the trust's a f f a k S OT h e position of the Service
requires that the obligation to the noncharitable beneficiary end with
his death, and the governing trust language must therefore anticipate
the possibility that the beneficiary may die within the taxable year in
which an additional contribution is received.

IV. CURRENT
PROBLEM
AREAS
T h e following sections discuss several current problems in drafting
charitable remainder trust agreements and in administering estates and
trusts having charitable remainder interests. Model forms for such trusts
are not set forth, since they are the subject of Revenue Ruling 72-395 and
other published articles.

A. Designation of the Charitable Remainderman
1. Requirements for qual2fication under section 664. A very basic
question in the drafting of charitable remainder trusts is whether the
charitable remainderman must be specifically named irithe trust instrument, or whether the instrument may simply designate charitable purposes or a class of charities, giving the trustee discretion to select the ultimate charitable recipients.S1 The regulations require a trust instrument
to provide that an irrevocable remainder interest must be held "for the
benefit of, or to be paid over to, charity,"s2 and explain that upon the expiration of the noncharitable interest, "the entire corpus of the trust is required to be irrevocably transferred, in whole or in part, to or for the use
of one of more organizations described in section 170(c) or retained, in
whole or in part, for such use. "53 Whether this language means that the
charitable beneficiary must be specifically named and identified in the
trust instrument is not clear.
One answer is suggested by analogy with comment (2) of Revenue
Ruling 72-395 58 4.02 and 6.02, which provides that a charitable remainder may be: (1) distributed outright to, or held in further trust for, one
or more charities; (2) held in further trust for "charitable purposes"; or
50Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(6)(1972).
S1Only an organization described in section 170(c) may qualify as a remainderman. Treas.
Reg. 55 1.664-2(a)(6),-3(a)(6) (1972). Thus, only domestic charities may be qualified recipients.
S2Treas.Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(l)(i)(1972).
S3Trea.s. Reg. 55 1.664-2(a)(6)(i),-3(a)(6)(i)(1972).
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(3) disposed of in any combination of the foregoing.S4 T h e comment appears to permit a trust provision giving the trustee discretion to select the
specific charitable recipients where the remainder is held in further trust
for charitable purposes. There is little reason to distinguish this case
from a case in which the trust is required to terminate and distribute all
remaining trust assets to or for the use of one or more charitable organizations. In both cases, the trustee's discretion would be bounded by section 170(c). It is suggested, therefore, that the Service should issue a published ruling stating that a trust instrument authorizing the trustee to
exercise discretion in selecting qualified charitable recipients upon termination of the trust is valid under section 664.
A related problem is that the regulations do not indicate whether a
donor may reserve the right to designate, either by inter vivos instrument
or by will, the charitable recipients of the remainder interest. T h e Service presently allows such designation only by inter vivos instrument, and
will disqualify the trust if the donor retains a power to designate or alter
the specific charitable recipients by will. The regulations provide, in
relevant part, as follows:
A trust is not a charitable remainder annuity trust [or unitrust] if any
person has the power to alter the amount to be paid to any named person
other than an organization described in $ 170(c) if such power would
cause any person to be treated as the owner of the trust, or any portion
thereof, if subpart E of part 1 of subchapter J of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A
of the Code were applicable to such trust.55

This language is concerned solely with a power in any person to alter the
amount to be paid to a noncharitable income beneficiary and does not
apply to a power to designate the recipient of the charitable remainder
interest. Given the likelihood that both the needs of charity as well as
the charitable interests of donors may change, it is reasonable to permit
the donor to name the charitable remainder beneficiary either during
his lifetime or upon his death without disqualification under section 664.
As discussed above, the principal requirement of the statute and the
regulations promulgated thereunder is satisfied because the remainder
interest either passes "to, or for the use 06 an organization described in
Section 170(c) or is to be retained by the trust for such use."56
2. Section l7O(bXl) deduction limitations. A gift which is deemed
to have been made "to'' a charitable organization rather than merely "for
the use of" such an organization is eligible for both the maximum percentage limitations provided for charitable contributions under section
l7O(b)(l)(A) and for a carryover for 5 years of any excess contribution
-

-

541972-2 CUM. BULL.340, 343, 347. T h e ruling only contains examples of trust instruments in which specific charities are named.
55Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(3)(ii), -3(a)(3)(ii) (1972).
56Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(6)(i),-3(a)(6)(i) (1972).
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deductions pursuant to section l7O(d)(l) of the Code.S7 However, if the
charitable remainder beneficiary is not specifically named in the trust
instrument and the power of selection is reserved to the trustee or donor,
a question arises as to whether the gift in trust is made "to" charity or
merely "for the use o f ' charity. In Lawrence R. JamesS8 the Tax Court
drew a distinction between a right to the income from trust assets, which
was held to constitute a gift "for the use of" charity, and a vested right in
the remainder interest of the trust (i.e., trust principal), which was characterized as a gift "to" charit~.~g
Alice Tullym was cited by the court in
James for the proposition that a gift of a remainder interest in trust
creates a present right in the principal of the trust, even though the
recipient charities were not expressly designated in the trust instrument
but were to be selected from among the class defined by section 17O(b)(l)

(A).
No relevant change has been made in section l7O(b)(l) since the Tully
case, although section 664 has subsequently created two new forms of
charitable remainder trusts. The Tully and James cases should stand,
therefore, for the proposition that a charitable remainder trust described in section 664(d) constitutes a gift "to" charity for purposes of
section 170, even though the specific charitable remainderman may not
be named in the trust instrument.
Since the principal of an annuity trust or unitrust may be invaded for
the benefit of noncharitable interests only to the extent necessary to
satisfy the annual payout requirement, the value of the remainder
interest ultimately passing to charity can be measured with comparative
ease.62 In addition, as long as the transfer of property is irrevocable and
the trust instrument limits the class of eligible remainder recipients
strictly to organizations described in section 170(c), the underlying purpose of the 1969 reforms will be satisfied, i.e., the amount of the charitable deduction allowed will more nearly reflect the amount ultimately
passing to charity. Under the authority of Tully and other similar cases,
the question of exactly which section 170(c)organizations will ultimately
receive the trust remainder is immaterial. The maximum charitable
s7Treas. Reg. §$ 1.1TiOA-8(a)(2),-8(b), -10(a), -10(b) (1972).
5862 T.C. NO. 23 (May 15, 1974).
59The court held in James that a gift in trust of $1,250 to be paid first out of income and
then out of principal to organizations to be selected by the trustee for exclusively religious,
charitable, or educational purposes constituted a gift "for the use o f ' charity because charity
could only have a present right to the principal of the trust if the income of the trust was insufficient to provide for the fixed annual payment. Such a possibility was held to be so remote
as to be negligible. Id.
6048T-C. 235 (1965).
61LawrenceR. James, 62 T.C. No. 23 (May 15, 1954).
62For a more complete discussion of this point see notes 93-105 and accompanying text
infra.
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deduction permitted under section 170(b)(l)(A) should therefore be
available to the settlor of an otherwise qualified charitable remainder
annuity trust or unitrust irrespective of powers in the donor or trustee
to designate the specific charitable recipients.

B. Problems Arising from Deferral of the Annuity or Unitrust
Amount Payable

A testamentary charitable remainder trust is deemed created at the
date of the settlor's death, even though the trust is not actually funded
until after a reasonable period for administration of an estate or settlement of a terminating trust, provided that the obligation to pay the
annuity or unitrust amount begins as of the date of death.63 In such circumstances, actual payment of the annuity or unitrust amount may be
deferred (if permitted by state law and the trust instrument) until the
end of the taxable year of the trust in which complete funding occurs.64
Problems have arisen, however, in determining whether deferral will
also be permitted for certain types of inter vivos remainder trusts, and in
computing the deferred annuity or unitrust amount payable to the noncharitable income beneficiary.
1. When is deferral permitted? As previously noted, where complete
funding of an otherwise qualified testamentary trust is dependent upon
pourover contributions from an estate or a terminating trust, payment of
the annuity or unitrust amount may be deferred during a reasonable
period for administration of the estate or settlement of the prior trust.65
However, the regulations do not expressly indicate whether the right to
defer payment of the annuity or unitrust amount is available in situations
other than those involving testamentary trusts. Reg. 8 1.664-1(a)(5) is
entitled "Rules applicable to testamentary transfers,'' but nothing in the
text of the regulation or in the accompanying examples of situations in
which deferral is permitted suggests that a restrictive application of the
deferral rules was intended.
In the usual case involving an inter vivos remainder trust which is
either irrevocable or is to become irrevocable on the death of the grantor,
the trust is fully funded during the grantor's lifetime66 and is not dependent upon pourover contributions from an estate or another trust.
In such cases it is clear that deferral of the annuity or unitrust amount
payable is neither necessary nor permissible. The regulations are not
clear, however, as to whether deferral may be available in cases involving:
(1) a revocable, nominally funded inter vivos charitable remainder trust
which, pursuant to its terms, becomes irrevocable on the death of the
63Treas.Reg. $ 1.664-l(a)(5)(i)(1972).
641d.

65Treas. Reg. § 1.664-l(a)(5)(i)(1972).
66See generally Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-l(a)(6)(example 1 ) (1972).
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grantor and which is dependent for complete funding upon a pourover
from an estate or a terminating trust; or (2) an irrevocable, funded inter
vivos unitrust which is to receive a pourover from an estate or a terminating trust.
a. T h e revocable, nominally funded inter vivos trust. Whenever
complete funding of a revocable, inter vivos charitable remainder trust,
which is to become irrevocable on the death of the grantor, is dependent
upon a pourover contribution from an estate or another terminating
trust, deferral of the annuity or unitrust amount payable should be allowed during a reasonable period for administration of the estate or
settlement of the prior trust. The crucial factor in the application of the
deferral rules of Reg. 5 1.664-1(a)(5)(i) appears to be the dependency of
thbetrust on a pourover contribution. While revocable inter vivos trusts
of this type may be nominally funded during the life of the grantor, as a
factual matter, they are totally dependent upon a pourover before complete funding can occur. Thus, despite the absence of express language in
the regulations which would permit this result, allowing deferral in such
cases should be fully justified because the significance of the trust and its
role in the estate plan parallels that of a testamentary trust which is dependent upon a pourover for complete funding, and for which deferral
is clearly allowed.
b. T h e irrevocable, funded inter viuos unitrust. The problem presented in the case of an irrevocable, funded inter vivos unitrust, which is
entitled to receive additional contributions from the grantor's estate or
from another trust terminating on the grantor's death, lies in determining when the contribution is deemed to have been made for purposes of
computing the unitrust amount payable to the noncharitable beneficiary.
Is the contribution made as of the date of the grantor's death or as of the
date when the final distribution from the estate or terminating trust
has been made? The regulations clearly provide that all property passing
to a unitrust by reason of the grantor's death is considered one contribut i ~ nand
, ~ since
~
the unitrust becomes entitled to receive this contribution from the date of the grantor's death, the Service could insist that the
contribution was made on that date. Accordingly, the trustee could be
required to make a reasonable estimate of the then present value of the
contribution and to reflect that amount in his determination of the
annual amount payable for each year prior to the actual receipt of such
contribution. If, on the other hand, the contribution is deemed made in
the year in which the full amount of property passing to the unitrust by
reason of the death of the grantor has actually been received, no annual
amount attributable to the additional contribution would be required
to be paid to the noncharitable beneficiary until such year - a result
67Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(b) (1 972).
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clearly unfair to such beneficiary. A practical solution would be to
assume that the additional contribution was made as of the date of the
grantor's death, but permit deferral of the amount payable until the full
amount of the contribution has actually been received by the trust.
While this result is not expressly provided by the regulations, it appears
to be consistent with the requirements of Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(5)(i)which
limit deferral to those cases in which actual receipt of the funds passing
to the trust by reason of the settlor's death is delayed for a reasonable
period for administration of the estate or settlement of a terminating
trust.
2. What constitutes "completefundingJ'? Once it is concluded that
payment of the annuity or unitrust amount may be deferred, the trustee
of a charitable remainder trust must still determine the length of the
period during which deferral is permissible. T h e regulations provide
that payment may be deferred until the end of the taxable year in which
"complete funding" of the trust occurs,68 but fail to specify whether
"complete funding" means actual or constructive receipt of all property
passing to the trust by reason of the grantor's death. This distinction
becomes significant in those cases in which an estate or inter vivos trust
is deemed terminated for tax purposes before all pourover amounts
designated for the charitable remainder trust have been distributed.
The Service might take the position that in such circumstances the charitable remainder trust is in constructive receipt of all pourover amounts
as of the date of termination. Accordingly, since payment of the annuity
or unitrust amount may not be deferred after "complete funding" of the
trust, the trustee of the charitable remainder trust could be required to
cause the executor or trustee of the terminated estate or trust to pay the
annuity or unitrust amount to the noncharitable income beneficiary
within a reasonable period following termination.69 However, this
situation is likely to arise only in the unusual circumstances where the
Service deems an estate or trust terminated for tax purposes because of
the lapse of an unreasonable period for administration or ~ e t t l e m e n t . ~ ~
It would therefore seem appropriate to permit the charitable remainder
trust to remain qualified, even though the annuity or unitrust amount is
not paid within a reasonable period following such termination, as long
as the trustee has acted reasonably in pursuing his rights under state law
against the fiduciary of the terminated estate or trust.
A related problem which may occur more frequently arises in the case
6sTreas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(a)(5)(i)(1972).
69A trust must pay any deferred amount within a reasonable period of time after the complete funding of the trust. Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(5)(i)(1972). A reasonable period of time
for payment of the unitrust amount following the end of the taxable year extends to the date
upon which the trustee is required to file Form 1041-B (including extensions) for such year.
Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(a) (1972).
'OTreas. Reg. 5 1.641(b)-3(b) (1956).
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of a terminated estate or trust which either comes into possession of
unforeseen assets or which, after paying all debts and liabilities, finds that
it has excess assets distributable to the charitable remainder trust. Presumably, the charitable remainder trust was completely funded upon the
"final" distribution from the terminated estate or trust. This unexpected
receipt of additional assets raises a question concerning the obligation of
the trustee to the noncharitable income beneficiary with respect to payment of the annual amount due in prior years. A practical solution to
this problem would be to treat the newly found assets as increasing the
value of the general trust assets as of the date of actual receipt. The
administrative convenience of this approach should be particularly appealing to the trustee, since the payout to the noncharitable income
beneficiary would be increased only in the year in which such assets
were actually received.
The prospect of receiving additional assets presents particularly
knotty theoretical questions in the case of an annuity trust, since no additional contributions are permitted to be received by such trust. However,
the answer may be that all property passing to the trust by reason of the
death of the grantor is treated as one contribution - a rule which should
encompass the receipt of additional assets under the above circumstances.T1
3. N e t fair market value. Before discussing the actual computation
of the deferred amount payable to the noncharitable beneficiary, it is
desirable to examine the definition of the term "net fair market value."
In general, the sum certain to be paid under an annuity trust must be
stated as a fraction or a percentage (which is not less than 5 percent) of
the "initial net fair market value," as finally determined for federal tax
purposes, of the property passing in trust.72 The unitrust amount payable must be computed pursuant to a fixed percentage (which is not less
than 5 percent of the "net fair market value of the trust assets determined
ann~ally."~3
However, neither section 664, nor the regulations thereunder, define the term "net fair market value," and it is not used in any
other section of the Code.74 Instead, the regulations merely provide that,
in determining the net fair market value of the trust property, all assets
and liabilities of the trust are to be taken into account regardless of
whether particular items would be included in determining the income
of the trust.75
71Treas.Reg. 8 1.664-2(b)(1972).
72Treas.Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(l)(ii),-2(a)(l)(iii),-2(a)(2)(i) (1972).
73Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(a)(1972).
741t does, however, appear in Treas. Reg. $5 1.334-l(c)(4)(viii)(1955), and 1.334-2 (1955)
(relating to the basis of property received by shareholders in a corporate liquidation under
section 333), where the term is defined as the fair market value of an asset less any specific
mortgage or pledge to which the asset is subject.
75Treas.Reg. 8 1 -664-3(a)(l)(iv)(1972).
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The regulations also provide that the trustee shall have full discretion
in selecting the taxable year of the trust, the valuation date or dates, and
the valuation methods to be used in making the computation. However,
once made, the trustee's election is irrevocable and must be consistently
followed in subsequent year~.~6
Thus, the trustee should carefully consider his options of utilizing different methods and dates in valuing
separate categories of trust property and in computing the net fair market
value on the basis of the average or mean of such values. Moreover, in
the absence of specific section 664 rules or methods for valuing different
categories of trust property, the trustee may appropriately refer to the
rules and methods for valuing assets for estate tax purposes contained
in section 203 1, or to the section 4942 rules concerning the valuation of
assets for determining the annual amount of qualifying distributions
which must be made by private foundations.77
Special valuation problems are presented by accrued liabilities, such as
funeral expenses, trustee's commissions, and attorney's fees. Even though
the trust's accounts are kept on the cash method of accounting, such
liabilities should be deductible from the gross fair market value of trust
assets if ascertainable with reasonable certainty, i.e., if all events have occurred which fix the liability, even though the amount must be estimated
and cannot be fixed with e x a c t n e s ~ . ~ ~
For example, annual trustee commissions should constitute an accrued
liability in each taxable year even though they are not paid until the
trustee's final accounting has been approved. Commissions based upon
the final value of the estate or trust assets, on the other hand, should constitute an accrued liability only in the final taxable year. Attorney's fees
present a more difficult question because they represent servicesrendered
over the entire period, but may not be approved for payment in full until
the entire legal account has been settled. A practical resolution of this
problem would be to assume that if a bill has been received by the trustee
requesting partial payment (i.e., creating an account) for legal services
rendered, an accrued liability would be created. In the absence of such a
bill, however, it may be difficult for the trustee to make an estimate of the
portion of the legal expense incurred in any specific taxable year. I n such
cases, the legal fee should be taken as an accrued expense in the final taxable year of the estate or terminating trust, which would normally be the
year in which complete funding of the remainder trust occurs.

76~d.

77F0r example, securities which are traded in the public markets are valued for purposes
of Treas. Reg. 8 20.2031-2(b) (1958) as the mean of the highest and lowest quoted selling
prices on the valuation date. No specific rule is laid down under Treas. Reg. 8 53.4942(a)-2(c)
(4)(i) (1973), however, except the statement that a computer pricing system accepted by the
Commissioner for federal estate tax purposes may be used.
'8Treas. Reg. $8 1.461-1(a)(2)(1947), 20.2053-1(b)(3) (1958).
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4. Corrective payments arising from a final determination of net fair
market value. The net fair market value of the trust property is likely to
be incorrectly determined from time to time. In order to qualify under
section 664, the trust instrument must, therefore, provide for corrective
payments by the trustee in the case of an underpayment, and for similar
Such correcpayments by the beneficiary in case of an ~verpayment.~S
tive payments must be distributed within a reasonable period of time
after thefinal determination of net fair market value,80and are included
in the taxable year in which paid, credited, or required to be distributed,
The
l regulations do not
even though made with respect to a prior ~ e a r . ~
indicate who is to make such final determination, but it seems clearly
intended that such determination is either to be made by the Commissioner or adjudicated in court.
In the case of an annuity trust, proper determination of net fair market
value should not prove particularly troublesome, since in the usual case,
the value of the assets transferred to the trust will be finally determined
upon the audit of the income or estate tax return filed by the grantor or
his estate. In contrast, the problem of accurately determining net fair
market value should arise persistently in the case of a unitrust, because
the trustee's determination will generally not be subject to current
review by the Service unless the issue is raised and determined during an
audit of the income beneficiary's tax return. Moreover, even though the
beneficiaries acquiesce in the trustee's valuation of the assets, both the
trustee and the beneficiaries will remain contingently liable for any adjustment in such value by the Service until such time as the Service is
legally bound not to raise the issue. Until that happens, either through
the running of the statute or the execution of a closing agreement, there
has been no final determination within the meaning of the regulations.
This aspect of charitable remainder trusts creates a risk of liability both
to the trustee and to the beneficiaries not usually found in the circumstances presented by other forms of trusts and estates.
5. Determination of the annuity or unitrust amount payable during
the deferral period. The method for determining the aggregate annuity
or unitrust amount payable at the end of the deferral period may differ
in the case of an annuity trust as opposed to a unitrust. With respect to an
annuity trust, the amount payable is the difference between (a) the
amounts actually distributed to the noncharitable income beneficiary
during the deferral period, plus compound interest computed at 6 percent a year, and (b) the annuity amount payable, plus compound interest
at 6 percent a year.g2 The annuity amount payable in (b) must either be
79Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-2(a)(1) (iii) (1972), -3(a)(l)(iii)(1972).
s01d.
slTreas. Reg. 5 1.664-1(d)(4)(ii)( 1 972).
82Treas. Reg. $5 1.664-1(a)(5)(i)(1 972).
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a stated dollar amount., or a fraction or percentage of the initial net fair
market value of the property irrevocably passing in trust as finally determined for federal tax purposes.83 The valuation may be made, at the
election of the executor, either as of the date of the settlor's death or on
the alternative valuation date of 6 months following the settlor's death.84
The general computation method described above may also be used in
the case of a unitrust. However, as previously indicated, the unitrust
amount payable is a fixed percentage of the net fair market value of the
trust assets, as determined annually85 using the valuation dates and
methods initially selected by the trustee. Thus, computation of the unitrust amount payable is more complex, because a separate valuation must
be made for each year of the deferral period.
In addition to the general computation discussed above, tAe regulations also provide an alternative formula for computing the deferred
amount payable under a u n i t r u ~ t Since
. ~ ~ use of the alternative formula
is not discretionary with the trustee, but rather must be incorporated in
the governing unitrust instrument (either explicitly or by reference),
the draftsman must be aware of the differences between the alternative
formula and the general computation.
For example, the date for valuing trust assets in the general computation may be selected by the trustee (usually the first day of the taxable
year), and if 3 years elapse before the unitrust is completely funded,
separate computations based on the valuation date selected by the trustee
are required for each of the 3 years. The valuation date of the alternative
formula, on the other hand, is the earlier of the date of death of the last
noncharitable income beneficiary, or the last day of the taxable year in
which complete funding of the trust occurs. Significant differences will
result, therefore, if there has been a substantial increase or decrease in
the value of trust property during the deferral period. Moreover, even
if the value of the trust assets were identical for both computations,
the alternative formula would yield a lower payout to the noncharitable
beneficiary for two reasons: (1) the formula assumes that a valuation of
the assets at the end of the deferral period includes the actual income
earned during the period, and that the addition of 6 percent interest is
therefore unnecessary; and (2) the tables referred to in the formula compute the 6 percent interest as owing from the end of the taxable year
rather than from the date on which payment is required under the trust
instrument, e.g., equal monthly payments. T h e draftsman must carefully evaluate the nature of the assets transferred to the trust, the inter83For a discussion of what may constitute a final determination see text accompanying note
80 supra.
S4Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-2(c)(1972).
SsTreas. Reg. 5 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(a)(1972).
s6Treas. Reg. 5 1.664-l(a)(5)(ii)(1972).
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ests of the income beneficiary, and the administrative convenience afforded the trustee in making the required computations before deciding
whether to include the alternate formula in the trust instrument.
The language of the alternate formula presents some ambiguity when
applied to a trust which has been only partially fitnded on the death of
the last income beneficiary. The formula computes the unitrust amount
payable on the earlier of the date of death of the last income beneficiary
or the date on which the trust is completely funded, and provides that on
such date the value "of the property held in trust which is attributable to
property passing to the trust at the death of the decedent" is to be measured.87 It is unclear whether this language refers to the full amount of
property ultimately to pass to the trust by reason of the death of the
settlor, or only to such portion of that property as is actually held in trust
on the death of the last income beneficiary. Since a trust which is unfunded or only partially funded on the date of death of the income beneficiary would not actually hold in trust the full amount of the assets ultimately to be distributed to it when completely funded, the language "of
the property held in trust" should be construed to mean the value of all
property which is required to pass to the trust by reason of the death of
the grantor, whether or not such property is actually held in trust on the
date of death of the last noncharitable beneficiary.

C. Tax Consequences of an Estate's Accumulation or Distribution
of Amounts Payable to a Charitable Remainder Trust
The remaining sections of this article explore some of the differing tax
consequences to the grantor's estate, the charitable remainder beneficiary,
and the noncharitable income beneficiary flowing from the estate's
accumulation or distribution of "trust" income prior to complete funding of the trust.
1. Current distribution by the estate to the noncharitable beneficiary
of the charitable remainder trust. If the estate distributes amounts directly to the noncharitable beneficiary during the administration period, the
estate is allowed a distribution deduction pursuant to section 66 1 (a). Upon receipt of such distributions, the beneficiary will recognize income
for federal income tax purposes as provided under the familiar distributable net income ("DNI ") rules of sections 66 1 and 662, rather than under
the special characterization rules of section 664.88 It is possible, therefore, for the estate to withhold all distributions to the income beneficiary
until a year in which little or no taxable income has been realized by the
estate, e.g., a short taxable year caused by termination of the estate. The
871d.
88Section662(a), (b); Treas. Reg. $ 1.664-1(a)(5)(iii) ( 1 972).
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amounts distributed to the beneficiary under such circumstances would
be subject to little, if any, tax.89
2. ABA committee proposal concerning the section 642(cj deduction
for accumulations of income payable to the charitable remainder trust.
If an estate accumulates income for eventual distribution to a charitable
remainder trust, a question arises as to whether the estate is entitled to a
section 642(c) charitable deduction (set aside deduction) for income permanently set aside for a qualified section 664 trust. This question is the
subject of a 1974 report by a committee of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association.90 T h e committee proposed adding a new paragraph
"(3)" to section 642(c) which would expressly allow a deduction for any
amount of the estate's distributable net income, reduced by tax exempt
income, which, pursuant to the terms of the will, was permanently set
aside during the taxable year for distribution to a qualified section 664
trust. The committee also proposed the addition of a new subsection
"(f)" to section 664 which, in the year of distribution, would attribute
to the trust an amount of gross income equal to the amount of the section
642(c) deduction allowed to the estate.
The proposed amendment to section 642(c) is premised upon a conclusion by the members of the committee that a set aside deduction would
not otherwise be available to the estate, because the possibility that the
principal of a section 664 trust might be invaded to meet the annual payout requirement to the noncharitable beneficiary cannot be regarded as
remote. The amendment was limited to the set aside deduction presumably on the assumption that amounts of income actually paid to a
section 664 trust would qualify for a section 66 1(a) distribution deduction if the charitable deduction under section 642(c)were not available.gl
The committee was quite properly concerned that, if the estate were
not allowed a set aside deduction under present law, the burden of the
tax would fall entirely upon the charitable remainderman in the case of
an annuity trust, and substantially upon such remainderman in the case
of a unitrust.92 On the other hand, if the trust realized such income
directly, no tax burden would exist to the remainderman, and the noncharitable beneficiary would be taxed on the income distributed to him
by the trust pursuant to the characterization rules of Reg. 8 1.664-1(d)(l).
The effect of the proposed amendments, therefore, would be to shift the
89The right of an estate to distribute amounts to a person who is a beneficiary of the trust
and not directly of the estate is presumably based upon the desirability of avoiding unnecessary income commissions.
9OTax Section Recommendation No. 1974-4, Committee on Income of Estates and Trusts,
27 TAXLAW834 (1974).
glMott v. United States, 462 F.2d 512 (Ct. C1. 1972) (which denied a distribution deduction
for income distributed to a charity which failed to meet the requirements of section 642(c)).
But see Rev. Rul. 667,1968-2 CUM.BULL.289.
92The committee discussed an example involving an estate consisting of $500,000 of 8
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burden of the income tax away from the charitable remainderman by
allowing a set aside deduction to the estate, while preserving the character
of the income of the estate so that the noncharitable beneficiary would be
taxed on such income when ultimately distributed to him. The amendments would thus insure parallel tax consequences to all beneficiaries,
whether the income was earned directly by the trust or earned and
accumulated by the estate for future distribution to the trust.
T h e amendments would not, however, eliminate the possibility of
differing tax consequences to the noncharitable beneficiary if the estate
made distributions directly to such beneficiary during the deferral period. As previously discussed, the usual DNI rules apply to estate distributions on a year-by-year basis, whereas the special characterization
rules of Reg. $ 1.664-1(d)(l) apply to trust distributions on a total experience or throw-back basis. When planning distributions during the
deferral period, the fiduciaries of estates and trusts should therefore give
special consideration to the tax consequences resulting to the noncharitable beneficiary if the distributions are made by the estate rather than
by the trust.
3. Remainder interest measurable for section 642(c) purposes despite
the possibility that principal will be invaded. Unfortunately, the
remedial legislation suggested by the ABA committee will not cure the
problems faced by existing estates during the taxable years prior to the
enactment of such legislation. Under current law, the central issue in
determining whether a set aside deduction is available to an estate is
whether the possibility of invading the principal of the recipient charitable remainder trust for the benefit of a noncharitable interest can be
considered so remote as to be negligible. Thus, under existing law, the
charitable deduction is disallowed if there exists a sufficient likelihood
that the charitable remainder interest could be defeated or limited upon
the action of a trustee or upon the occurrence of events beyond the remainderman's power to control. As previously noted, the ABA committee report concluded that because there was a substantial possibility that
the annuity or unitrust amount payable would exceed the trust's annual
income and that principal would have to be invaded to make up the
difference, no set aside deduction would be available to an estate for
transfers to a section 664 trust. The report did not discuss the fact, however, that in a section 664 trust, the extent to which principal may be
invaded is strictly limited by the statute and the regulations.
percent corporate bonds and $300,000 of income in respect of a decedent. A residuary annuity
trust requires the payment of 5 percent of the initial value of the trust to the noncharitable
beneficiary, i.e., S40,OOO. If the estate accumulates the bond interest each year, an income tax
will be paid by the estate on $340,000 which will reduce the amount distributable to the
trust when completely funded although the trust will still be required to pay the $40,000 for
each year of deferral undiminished by taxes paid by the estate. The estate would have to
pay tax on only $300,000 a year if it made current distributions to the noncharitable beneficiary.
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Although brief mention was made of the Ithaca Trust Companyg3and
Merchants National Bank of Bostong4 cases, the only authority discussed
by the ABA committee in support of its conclusions and recommendations was Revenue Ruling 66-367.95 In Revenue Ruling 66-367, a
charitable deduction was allowed even though the trust instrument permitted invasion of the trust corpus when necessary to support the income
beneficiary in the manner to which she had become accustomed. T h e
ruling indicated that the income of the trust was more than sufficient to
support the beneficiary in her accustomed manner. After considering
such factors as the beneficiary's life expectancy, her past standard of
living, and the projected trust income, the ruling held that the possibility
that trust principal would be invaded was so remote as to be negligible.
In Ithaca, facts similar to those in the above ruling were presented.
The Supreme Court sustained the challenged charitable deduction on
the grounds that the standard for invading trust principal was fixed,
readily ascertainable, and capable of being stated in definite money terms.
In Merchants National Bank, however, the Court denied the deduction
because the power to invade was not limited to the beneficiary's accustomed life style, but included the beneficiary's happiness - a standard
viewed by the Court as too uncertain and speculative to permit accurate
measurement of the extent of future diversions from corpus.
Since the value of the charitable remainder interest in both annuity
trusts and unitrusts is capable of being measured with precision, section
664 trusts are substantially different from the trusts described in the foregoing authorities and from almost every case or ruling decided under
prior law. In the case of a section 664 trust, there is no necessity to compare the beneficiary's estimated needs with his other income and assets,
or to project the amount of trust earnings. Rather, by using the Service's
actuarial tables, a donor can readily ascertain the present value of the
portion of his transfer in trust allowable as a charitable deduction for
income, estate, or gift tax purposes. If the deduction can be measured,
and is allowable to donors under sections 170, 2055, and 2522, it seems
anomalous not to allow the estate a corresponding set aside deduction
under section 642(c). The ABA committee, however, did not consider
this inconsistency, even though the rules for deduction should be the
same. T h e committee also failed to consider several authorities involving
trusts more closely resembling those described in section 664 -authorities which would suggest that under current law, a section 642(c) set aside
deduction should be available to an estate for all amounts ultimately
payable to such trusts.
93Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929), rev'g 64 Ct. C1.686 (1928).
94Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U S . 256 (1943), aff'g 132 F.2d 483 (1st Cir.
1942).
951966-2 CUM.BULL.241.
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Revenue Ruling 54-285,96 for example, involving facts similar to
Ithaca and Revenue Ruling 66-367, is significant because of the language
used to describe the circumstances in which a deduction is allowed.
In view of the foregoing it is held that a charitable deduction for estate
tax purposes may be allowed on account of bequests or gifts of remainder
interests to charity in cases where the will or instrument authorized
invasion of corpus for the comfortable maintenance and support of life
beneficiaries if (1) there is an ascertainable standard covering comfort
and support which may be either expressed or implied, and (2) the probability of invasion is remote or the extent of the inuasion is calculable
i n accordance with some ascertainable standurd.g7

Section 664 trusts do not permit invasion of the trust based on any standard other than the fixed amount payable to the noncharitable beneficiary. The extent of any invasion is, therefore, much easier to calculate
than in the Ithaca type trusts for which deductions were allowed.
Estate of S. ~childkraut~~constitutes
persuasive authority that a charitable deduction should be permitted for any transfer in trust where the
charitable interest is presently ascertainable, and where there is assurance that charity will actually receive such interest. In Schildkraut, the
settlor's will created a $300,000 testamentary trust and directed the
trustees to pay his widow $12,000 a year out of income or, if income was
insufficient, out of principal. T h e trustees were also directed to pay all
federal and state income taxes owed by the widow as the result of the
trust distribution, as well as all property taxes on her Florida real estate
as long as she owned such property. Upon the widow's death, the principal and accumulated income, if any, vested in a qualifying charitable
foundation.
Reversing the decision of the Tax Court, the Second Circuit permitted an estate tax charitable deduction for the commuted value of
the charitable remainder interest. In arriving at this result, the court
used the tax rates as of the settlor's death as a standard for determining
the value of the power to invade the trust assets for payment of the
widow's tax liabilities. Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the
widow's actual life expectancy would be materially different, the court
approved the use of an actuarial computation of her life expectancy. The
key assumption made in assessing the probability of invasion, however,
was a 3% percent income rate - the rate utilized by the Service in determining the present value of money to be received in the future.99 Noting
961954-2Cuxr. BULL.302.
S71d.at 303 (emphasis added).
S8Estate of Sol Schildkraut v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 40 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386
U.S. 959 (1967).
S9Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) (1958). T h e court also referred to the 3% percent discount
rate utilized by the triers of fact in the second circuic in personal injury cases to compute the
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that the case did not involve a degree of "uncertainty appreciably greater
than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs,"lOO the court
asserted that the many assumptions made in valuing the charitable interest were both reasonable and frequently made in other areas of the law.
Since no qualifying section 664 trust may contain a power, no matter
how limited, to invade principal for any purpose other than to satis5
the required annuity or unitrust amount payable, valuation of a section
664 trust is a much simpler task than was presented in Schildkraut. T o
illustrate, had the trust in Schildkraut been a qualified section 664 trust,
the court could have computed the life expectancy of the widow
actuarially and would not have had to make any of the other assumptions.
Moreover, the Service could not challenge the estimated income payout
rate because, as previously mentioned, such rate is derived from tables
issued by the Service for valuing the noncharitable and charitable remainder interests.lo1 In short, a section 664 trust presents a much stronger case for permitting a charitable deduction than the facts presented in
Schildkraut.
Subsequent cases have been favorably influenced by the test adopted
in Schildkraut, i.e., if the value of the charitable remainder interest is
presently ascertainable and there is assurance that charity will receive
such interest, a deduction will be allowed.lo2 In fitate of Judge,lo3 the
court discussed this test and commented as follows:
I t should be noted that the Schildkraut case asserts that this test instead
of the "so remote as to be negligible" test is applicable in these circumstances. This court believes that the test enumerated in Schildkraut in
effect states the underlying purpose of the remoteness test and is not inconsistent therewith.104

It is noteworthy that the government's position in Estate of Judge was
that no deduction was available because it was certain that some invasion of the corpus would occur. Presumably, this position prompted
the members of the ABA committee to conclude that legislative amendpresent value of money earned in the future. See generally, Conte v. Flota Mercante del
Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 670 (2d Cir. 1960); Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 271 F.2d 524,
527 (2d Cir. 1959). See also T.D. 7077, 1970-2 CUM.BULL.183; Treas. Reg. 55 20.2031-10(f)
(1970), 1.642(c)-6(d)(3)(1971) (concerning pooled income funds), 1.664-4(a)(5)(1972) (concerning unitrusts).
10°368 F.2d at 49 (quoting from Ithaca Trust Co., 279 U.S. at 154).
'OISee note 99 supra.
1O2In William T . Grant, 48 T.C. 606 (1967), (a case w h i l did not cite Schildkraut), the
Tax Court considered a provision requiring stock dividends having a value of 5 percent or
less to be paid to the income beneficiary and whether a more than negligible possibility existed
that a diversion might occur. Although the value of the original shares will decrease upon
the issuance of stock dividends, the court concluded that the remainder interest can be computed with reasonable certainty.
1°3Estate of Margaret D. Judge, 371 F. Supp. 716 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
lo41d.at 722 n.4.
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ments were necessary. However, the government's position was expressly
rejected by the court in Judge.
T h e remoteness test is utilized in order to determine the likelihood
that the charity will take and the value of what it will receive. Newton
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 1947, 160 F.2d at 178-79. Therefore, if it
were factually shown that the possibility of invasion of the corpus beyond
a certain amount was so remote as to be negligible and the value of the
charitable bequest was then determinable, the remoteness test would be
met and a charitable deduction allowable. If it is proven that, beyond a
certain amount of the corpus the possibility of invasion of the remaining
portion is so remote as to be negligible, the purpose of the remoteness test
of assuring that the amount of the charitable deduction is no greater than
the amount which the charity does in fact eventually receive will have
been satisfied.lo5

Unfortunately, the taxpayer in Judge lost the deduction because the
trust instrument contained a power to invade corpus to pay all medical,
hospital, and nursing bills incurred by the life beneficiary. Even though
evidence was submitted as to the amounts actually distributed from the
trust for such purposes during the years 1967 through 1971, the court
concluded that on the basis of the evidence presented, the maximum
amount which would be utilized for such expenses could not be calculated with reasonable certainty.
4. Tax consequences to the noncharitable beneficiary of the payment
of the annuity or unitrust amount after the deferral period. The regulations require the noncharitable income beneficiary to take into his own
income the full annuity or unitrust amount in the year in which such
amount is paid, credited, or required to be distributed.1°6 Thus, a deferral in the payment of such amounts results in a bunching of the beneficiary's income in the taxable year in which the accumulated payments
are made.107
As previously discussed, the general computation of the amount payable for the deferral period includes 6 percent interest. However, since
the obligation to pay the amount attributable to this interest is imposed
by the federal tax law and not state law, it is not clear whether this
amount constitutes interest income to the beneficiary within the meaning of section 61 (a)(4) or is to be taxed to the beneficiary pursuant to the
normal characterization rules of section 664. If the 6 percent amount
is treated as interest income, the reservoir of taxable income of the trust
subject to the characterization rules would be unchanged, and the potential tax liability of the beneficiary would be increased.
T h e regulations under section 6 1 include as taxable interest any interlo5Zd. at 72 1.

lo6Treas. Reg. 9 1.664-1(d)(4)(ii)(1972).
lo7Seenote 17 supra.
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est paid under state law with respect to overdue legacies.lO8 Interest normally accrues in such cases if a legacy remains unpaid after the expiration of a specified period of time, e.g., 6 months. However, since few
similarities exist between a legacy of a stated amount and the obligation
to pay the annuity or unitrust amount, a reasonable interpretation of the
regulations would exclude the so-called deferred interest amount from
section 6 1(a)(4), and treat it merely as a device for determining the total
amount payable. Under this approach, such amount would be taxed to
the noncharitable income beneficiary pursuant to the characterization rules of section 664. This view is supported by the absence of any
interest figure in the alternative computation formula provided for
unitrusts. Taxation of the deferred amount payable should not be dependent upon the method utilized in computing such amounts.
5. Measurement of the section 642(c) and section 661(a) deductions.
Even if the section 642(c) deduction is available to an estate for amounts
paid or permanently set aside for distribution to a section 664 trust, questions remain concerning the effect of the deduction upon the trust and
the proper measurement of the deduction allowed to the estate.
Although a charitable remainder trust pays no tax on income earned
by it or attributed to it as the result of an estate distribution, the trustee
is required to determine the tax character of all trust income and assets
for purposes of taxing future distributions to the noncharitable beneficiary. In the case of a distribution from an estate which qualifies for
the section 642(c) deduction, however, this task is complicated by the fact
that such distributions are not attributed with any income character
under the familiar DNI rules of section 662. In such cases, it only comports with common sense to treat distributions having no income charOn the other hand, to the extent a
acter as an item of trust c~rpus.~Og
distribution from an estate does not qualify under section 642(c) and is
therefore subject to the distribution deduction rules of section 661(a), the
trust should be attributed with the receipt of various categories of income as determined pursuant to the DNI rules of section 662(b). Such
income would pass out to the noncharitable beneficiary in future distributions from the trust according to the characterization rules of Reg.
8 1.664-1(d)( 1)(i) previously referred to.l10
A related question concerns the proper method for determining the
amount of the section 642(c) deduction allowable to the estate. A logical
- -

108Treas. Reg. 5 l.61-7(a) (1957).
lO9But see Treas. Reg. 5 53.4940-1(d)(2) (1972) which, for purposes of the 4 percent tax o n
net investment income of private foundations, provides that distributions from trusts to
private foundations do not carry over income except with respect to distributions from split
interest trusts described in section 4947(a)(2) created after 1969 (which would include section
664 trusts). The enforceability of the regulation has not as yet been tested.
llOSee note 17 supra.
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approach to the problem would be to compute the deduction on the same
basis as for income, estate, and gift taxes. The rules for the various deductions should be identical and should not vary merely because section
642(c) and not section 170 or section 2055 is involved. Reg. $9 1.664-2(c)
and 1.664-4 provide general rules for determining the present value of
the remainder interest of annuity trusts and unitrusts respectively. Thus,
where distributions to the trust are made by the estate, the amount attributable to the remainder interest would be deducted under section
642(c), and the rest of the distribution would be deducted in accordance
with the distribution rules of section 66 1(a). Amounts permanently set
aside for charity by the estate would be subject to the same apportionment. It should be noted, however, that the estate would be subject to
tax on the amount of income apportioned to the noncharitable interest.
Moreover, the ultimate burden of such tax would be borne by the charitable remainder interest and the unfairness recognized by the ABA committee would exist. T o avoid this result, the executor would be required
to distribute such amounts either to the beneficiary or to the trust.
Apportioning amounts otherwise qualifying under section 642(c) between the noncharitable and charitable interests and only allowing a
deduction for the latter is a logical extension of the Schildkraut approach. Under prior law, however, the usual approach was to determine whether the possibility of invasion was remote and to deny or allow
the deduction for the full amount without apportionment. In light of
the present state of the law, there does not appear to be sufficient
authority to sustain a deduction under this approach for the full amount
of estate income designated for a section 664 trust. In contrast, the approach of sections 170,2055, and 2522 is to divide every dollar passing to
a section 664 trust between the noncharitable and charitable interests.
T h e charitable deduction under section 642(c) should be valued on the
same basis.

We have only begun to perceive the problems and complexities presented by the new forms of charitable remainder trusts described in section 664. While hope exists that the new statute and regulations will
permit the development of a well-recognized, clearly defined method for
dividing gifts between loved ones and charity, many fear that the present
complexities in this area of the law will adversely affect charitable gift
giving. Under these circumstances, the lawyer's responsibility to his
client and to the public is most formidable.

